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Dcscart c!'. on Error and Madness 
by Emanuela Scribano* 
\ l11tract: In the fourth Meditation, Descartes' theory of error holds bad use of free will 
11 , ponsible for mistaken judgment. This theory turns out to be apposite only for an 
.uhrlt and sound human being. In infancy and if ili, the mind cannot suspend judgment, 
l ~·l ausc its brain alteration necessarily dictates a judgment, often mistaken. Thc most 
dr.11natic case is madness, which necessarily induces the mind lo makc mistakcn 
111dgments beyond correction. Madness is not just an extreme case of false 
1q1rcscntation of Lhe world. In the Dioptrique, madness is a crucial expcriment for 
1111dc rstanding the physio logical mechanics of perception. This claim has the 
rnnscquencc of making it hard lo distinguish betwecn madness and normality, and 
lhl'll bctween error and trulh, as La Forge and Malebranche will realize. 
A.1',rwords: error, madness, Descartes 
ln the Fourth Meditation, Dcscartes takes a c lcar stance on errar: erra r 
d1.: pcnds on free choice and is therefore always avoidable1• This pri nciple is 
l'sscntial far the metaphysical foundation of science to be complete. Basically, 
l>cscartes' task consists in bui lding a theory lo thc effect that if thc human 
rnind relics only on its clear and distincl ideas, if it does no t fa ll into the trap 
of precipitation, and if it frces itself from the bonds of prejudice, then thc 
propositions to which the mind is necessitated to assent will also be true, as 
thcy will be guaranteed by divine veracity. The princ iple appcars far thc fìrst 
time in ali its clarity in thc Meditations and is thcn re iterated in thc Principles 
o[ Philosophy. lndeed, the formulation in this latter work is notably resolute: 
But whoever turns out to have crcated us, and however powerful and however 
dcceitful he may be, in the meantime we nonctheless experience within us the kind of 
lrcedom which enables us always lo refrain from believing things which are nol 
completely certain and thoroughly examined. Hence we are ablc to take precautions 
against going wrong on any occasion2. 
* emanuela.scribano@unive. it; Università Ca' Foscari. Venezia. Traduzione inglese di 
Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero 
I. Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia, AT VII, pp. 56-62. CSM Il, pp. 39-43. 
2. Principia philosophiae, I, §6. 
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Already in the Meditations , however, it is clear thai thc possibility nl 
ideally always avoiding error is affirmed only insofar as the mind is considercd 
independent from its body. Indeed, in the Sixth Meditation, the resurgencc ol 
the body after sinking due to the First Mcditation 's doubl immediately forccs 
the author into a suddcn about-facc. As for thc errors induced by the senscs, 
Descartes does not repcal the Fourth Meditation's account, according lo which 
il is always possible to refrain from judging. He prefers instead to rely on thc 
practical purposc of scnsibility. Whcn we consider the mind being united with 
its body and the perceptions that arisc from sense expcrience, wisdom 
rccommends that wc do not rcly on these in our quest for trulh, as thc senses 
are dcsigned for the betler preservation of lifc and not for ascertaining how thc 
world rcally is3. What is more, the same practical domain in which the senscs 
were supposed to work as reliable guides is, in fact, where real "errors of 
nature" take piace, when in the case of disease the bodily mechanism arouses 
in the mind dcsires that , if satisfìed, are detrimental to health and life4 . 
The spccifìc connection between body and mind sets strict limits on thc 
Fourth Meditation's account. These limits emerge repeatedly in Descartes' 
reflections. The case of disease, expressly considered in the Sixth Meditation, 
is complemented with rccurrent reftections on childhood as a condition in 
which the connection to the body is so close that it necessari ly imposes 
erroneous beliefs. The child's mind, «closely ticd to the body», ascribes to the 
extcrnal bodies «tastcs, smells and so on»5. Thc stick in thc water «appcars to 
us in a way which would lead a chi Id to judge (ex quo infans judicaret) that it 
was bent»6. The Sixth Mcditation also ascribes to childhood the origin of the 
prejudices that occupy the adult mind7• 
Both thc case of childhood and the case of diseasc are emblcmatic of a 
condition in which the mind has no autonomy with respect to the messages 
that it receivcs from thc body. In such a condition, bodily modifications 
transiate into beliefs and judgmcnts in the mind, and thcre is no possibility of 
ncutralising such judgments induced by sense expcriencc itself by activating 
innate idcas that could determine judgments alternative to thc former. In 
discase as wcll as in childhood, the body rulcs and the mind can only registcr 
the modifìcations to the body in the form of necessary - and necessarily 
wrong - judgmcnts. Thus, both the theory of judgment and the thcodicy 
devcloped in thc Fourth Mcditation pertain only to the case of adults and 
healthy humans. The mind 's autonomy and conscquently its freedom are 
limited to the condition of adulthood and hcalth. Dcscartes explicitly states 
this restriction: 
3. Medùaciones de prima philosophia, AT VII, pp. 82-83. CSM Il, p. 57: «For 
knowledge of the truth about such Lhings seems to belong to thc mind alone, not to the 
combination of mind and body». 
4. AT VII, p. 88, CSM, pp. 60- 1. 
5. Principia philosophiae, I, §71. 
6. Sextae respo11sio11es, AT VII, pp. 438-439, CSM, p. 295. 
7. Medi1a1io11es de prima philosoplzia, AT VII, p. 83, CSM, p. 57. 
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/r . bm/\' the mind cnjoys some liberty LO 
I 111 lt w1t1·11 tl111v111g '" "" oc/11/1 allll hca/1, -'. • "·s wc know therc is not thc same ti~ Il i 111lll't thtnf'> lhan lho-.c prcscntcd by t lC scnng~ca~d the youngcr they are, thc lcss 
. ·k r aslccp or vcry you ' Il \ 1111 1111w who are stc o · 
11 11v 1lt{' ' hawx. · d d the 
. . on thc case of ch1l<lhoo an 
I ll hl ,11 ll'S clahoratcs ~cvcral umh es h'ldhood involves. As a clevcr and 
· I · d's frccdom t al c 1 h'ldh od as a luull 1111111 111 t 1c mm , k L Forge considers c t o 
t 1llhl11I dl\1.iplc ?f pcscartcs . w~; f~ee;om from the body's impuls~~·>. . 
I Il 1il1E 111 lor thc hm1ts of thc mm? e an<l chil<lhood, as the cond~t1?ns .m 
111 lhl' kttcr quotcd above, d1scas thc mind from exerc1smg its 
. t the body prevents . ent li 'li tlw connccuon o . . . . oin with drcaming, the pcrman 
ltu .111111 w1lh rcspect to. s~n~~~~?;e~arding the correspondcnce ~etwcen 
111111111•11111'1 of thc Cartcs1a . Madncss is not mentioned, bu~ ~1ther ?Y 
llll ttt .tl 1111agcs and ext~rnal rcal~y. considcring its rccurrent assoc1at1on w1~h 
ti l 111111~· Il a sort of <l1scase or y asily include madncss among t e 
111• "'" in Dcscartes' texts, wc can e . e t'ts own autonomy from the body • · . h · d cannot exerc1s t e 
,,1111l11111ns in wh1ch t ~mm . d in that thc sensory appearances are ru ' 
11111 1hu-. cannot rcfra1.n fro':° JU g g . 
\l.llll h are in fact certamly d1.stort~d. thc association between drea~mg and 
Mm:h ink has becn de~1c~te to here both conditions are menuoned to 
tt1.11lm.·ss in the First M~d1tat1on, w ondence between perceptions a~~ 
111 .t 11 y the doubt rega~d10g the co~~e~acroscopic and close expericnces . 
l 1r1 nal objects, cven IO the case <l min and madness dates from bcfore 
I h1wcvcr, the association. between rea s ~n the Dioptrics, composcd in the 
thr 1:irst Meditation, for tt al~~ady apx;;,:de that is, in thc carly 1630s}n the 
.. 1111l' ycars Descartes was wnt10g Le cn ~nd thosc who are asleep» . The 
I 110/llrics, Descartes evokes t~e .«~~~~echerche de la i•érité, whosc date hof 
.. 11nc associa~ion. appears .agam IO e widest range of hypolhcses1~. On th~ ol er 
u11nposition is sti li the obJeCMt o~ thd. sists a grcat dea\ on dreammg but it does 
han<l, the Discourse o11 the et w m . 
mit mcntion madness. t madness that involved Dernda a~d 
In thc resounding debate abou .d d Against Foucault's cla1m 
. s not cons1 ere · · · d 
h1ucault, the Dioptn~·s p~ssa.ge wa madness in Descartcs' text, .oc~n a 
ffirming thc marg1naltsauon of h f from being margmaltsed, 
.1 f 11 opriateness t at, ar . \y 111aintaincd with u. appr Descartes into ordinary experience precise 
inadness was rather mtegrated by 
24 CSM K p. 190. ernphasis added. 
cartcs à X***, August 1641, AT lll .. p. 4 ' e t~es-estroite. auroit cncorc pO ~·~:\orge 1974, p. 218: «Mais cell~ ~·~;s ~~~:j:ncs Enfans, Dieu avoit tell.cme~L 
l'estr~ davantage. si. cornrne nou~ voy?ns a vernen~ du Corps, qu'il n'en eOt Jarnais as~uiety toutcs !es ~nsécs Sde I [Esr~a~~~I ~~~toit pas expcdient ny à l'llomme ny à son 
aucune, qui ne luy :int d~s en~e.pr~iudice à sa liberté». 
faprit , et cela auro1L port trop 12-3. 
lO. AT Vll, pp. 18-19, CSM li, PP· l72. 
Il. La Diop1rique, AT VI.~· 1.41~ C~ ~~d people who believe that they are vascs or 
12. Descartes 2002, p. 11 c1t. mf" . . are tcrmed «rnelancoliques)>. 
f their body is of enormous s1le that a parto 
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by assimilaling it Lo dreaming, as is explic iLly done in the First Medilation. 
Caughl up in the heat of the dispute between Foucault and Denida, subsequent 
interpre lers have s trived to provide grist Lo the mili of one or Lhe o lher 
di sputanl, without straying from lhe pa th traced by them and, most 
imporlantly, without broadening lhe scope of their investigation to include 
texls Olher lhan the First M edilation13. In lhis way, Lhe physiological wrilings 
foaluring - Jong before the First Meditalion - the earlies t associations between 
dreams and madness remained complelely overlooked . Of course, Ferdinand 
Alquié approached lhe Lopic of madness by inquiring into Descartes' scient ific 
analyses of this phenomenon. However, he cvcnlually made mere speculative 
use of them and referred lo the c linica! c lassificalions of menlal disorders 
simply lo reflect on whal kind of madness should be prope rly Lermed 
«philosophi cal»
14
• M ore recenlly, when attenlion was paid to Descartes' 
physio logicaJ wriLings, it was only lo determine which kind of pathology he 
mcanL lo rc fer lo in the First Meditation, thereby corrcctly underscoring lhe 
specilìc i1y of lhat menta! di sorder. The "bl ack vapours" mentioned in the First 
Meditation, as well as the hallucinations conccrning the shape, size, and nature 
of one's own body, point to the symploms of whal lhe lileralure of thc time 
Lcrmcd «me lancholy»
15
. Bul even in lhis case, despile Lhe attention devoted lo 
the c linica! aspect of madness blatantly cvokcd by Dcscartes, no attention was 
paid to lhe roles played by madness and drea ms in his physiological writings. 
In my vicw, however, it is only Lhanks to the conlribu tion of thc physiological 
writings - thc Dioptrics, in parlicul ar - that lhe rcference to madness in 
assoc iation with dreaming acquires ils full signifìcance and reveals ils 
subslantial implications, thereby making it possible lo qualify and progress 
bcyond De rrida's anli-Foucaultian interprelation of the First Meditalion's 
rnadness in terms of "normalisation". 
In view or lhe recurring jo int mcnlion o r madncss and drcaming, it is worth 
pointing out lìrst thal lhe insane, as wcll as children, are in every respecl true 
humans. lndeed, lhey possess a mind, as dcmonstraled by the experiment 
conduclcd in a we ll-known passagc from lhc Discourse 0 11 Method concerning 
lhe fca lurc that disLing uishes huma ns from animals, viz. the facully of languagc: 
there are no men so dull-witted or stupid - and thi s inc ludes evcn madme n - that they 
are incapable of arranging various words togethe r and forming an utterance from them 
13. The debate on madness in Descartes' work was opcned by some brief remarks in 
Foucault 1961, pp. 54-57. The reply by Derrida 1967 provokcd an angry retort by Foucault 
1972. See the interpretation of the polemic in light of Descartcs' text by Beyssade 1973. 
Among the few who refer to Descartes' neurophysio logical writings in this respect is 
Kambouchner 2005, pp. 265 ff. On this issue, see al so Ka mbouchner 20 I O. Rocha 20 Il and 
Broughton 2005 are aligncd with Derrida. Cook 1990 is on Foucault' s side, whereas D' Amico 1994 is against him. 
14. Alquié 1994. 
15. Darriulat 1996. The «vapours» are also me ntioncd in the niop1ric 1·. AT VI. p. 141, CSM I. p. 172. 
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. d rstood· whereas there is no o the r an imai, how~ver 111 111d1·1 to make the1r thoughts un e • d th ' l1'ke [ ] it would be incred1ble d · be that can o e .. · I i h-1 1 and well-endowe it may k' arrot spccies s hould no t be able to speak as 
lii •I i ' uperio r specime~ of thc mon cy or p Il as a c hi Id with a de fecti ve brain- if the ir 
\\1 li·" the stup1dest chi Id - o r at lea.st as wc 16 
,.,1, wcre not completely differenl m nature fro m ours . 
I ' ' 
. . . . lhe reason for lhe sleady assoc1allon Sl'<.:ond, it is worth explammhg. . thc Search fior Truth is cvcn more d adness On t 1s 1ssue, 
1i, 1wccn dreams an m . . . thc Firsl Mcdilation seems to suggest 
11 l1)•lncning than lhe Medttatwns, as cnls againsl the certainty of scnse 
111.11 drcams and madnes~ ~re str~ng~r 0a(~~:c deception, simply because they I pnicnce than the trad1t1on~I casfe~h c rccplion of large and close objec1s11. 111.i~l' us doubt ev~n the verac1th fio r ;r~th Descarles stresses the fact thal -
i 111 thc conlrary, m the Searc . 1 both dreams and madness thc h h ·n sensc errors - 11 . · 
i • 1111 rary to w at appens i . bi as such as long as th is cond1t1on I d · · s not recog111 sa e d 
lii in:ptua ec~pt~on I n wh drcams and madness represent a ecpcr 
lkl\ l'>ts, and th1 ~ IS lhe reaso e lon than ordinary perceplual errors. 
1111d more unscuhng lcvc l of dee p h E doxe menlions ins lances o f the 
In the Search for Trut~1 , w pe n,. dure replies by minimi sing Lhe risk of b·i· f se percept1ons o ian · 
i1111d 1a i lly o scn :. h defecls of the senses are ali qu1lc easy 
ht·i ng dcccived by thc senses, as su~ being quile sure al present Lhat I am 
111 ll.'<.:ognize, and do nol prev~nt i:ne hr.om den lhat thc sun is shining on us, h walkmg m I 1s gar , · 
MT 111g you, t al we are h ' which o rdinarily appears to my senses is 
111d in a word, th~t everyt ml.g b entioning dreami ng and madness as 
· ,, E doxe m turn rep ics Y m 
fl'll 11mc. u . . ble and thus nol corrcclable: i ·"I.'~ where error IS no t recogn1 sa 
• . . re decepti ve on occasions when you are 
So il I wish to make you fear that the scnshesf a mc to teli you that the senses deccivc d · ·1 is not e noug o r f h 11111111·are of the eceptwn, I ·. ti decept1'on I shall have to go urt e r, 
. · h vou perce1ve ie · · h' k y1111 on certam occas1ons w en . f h e la nc ho lic individua ls w ho l m 
. h e seen one o l osc m h ' li 111<1 ask if you ave nev r f th •ir body to be enormous; t ey w1 I
, 11" 111\clves to be vases, o r take some part oh .e g·ne 1 ·1 to be [ ] you cannot take 
' h · ·ust as t ey ima 1 · .. · 
'""l'ar thai what they see a nd touc is ~ Il l'able Lo fa ll asleep and w hcther you 
. h h are not hke a men, 1 .' . . d 11 a m1ss if l ask w e t e r you ' . me that you are walking m th1s gar en, 
l ;lllllOl think, while asleep, thal y~u are re~~~h n~w you are certain. [ ... ] In pa rticular, 
lh ,11 thc sun is - in brief, ali the.thmgs ~ ~u ihave learned that you were crcatcd by a 
hnw can you be certain o f th1s w he hy b . have found il no more di ffìcult to 
. · li erful would w o, emg 
18 '"Jlc n or be mg a d-po~b. g. than to create us as you think you are? Ul'atc us as I a m escn 111 • 
, 57-58 CSM I, p. 140, emphasis added. 16. Discours de la merhode. _AT VI'. pp. - . ÀT VII . 18, CSM li, pp. 12- 13: «Yet 
17. Cfr. Meditationes de pruna p~ulosoph~a, t 1' pobiects which are very small or 
. , lly dece1ve us w1th respec o , h h h 
.il1hough the scnscs occasiona lie fs about which doubl is quite even ·' oug .e ey 
111 thc di stam:e. there are many othcr be . h . s' 111'ng by Lhe fì re weanng a wmtcr 
f .• ·1mplc that I am c1c, J ' Id . b . 
lllC lrom thc ~enscs. rn. cx,. . . '. . • . m hands, and so on. Again. how cou " · e 
d1c"111g-gown. holding tlw, p11i1 nl ~1 •. 1p7r n~ ..'{ Unlcss perhaps I wcrc to likcn myselt to ik11 11•d lhal thcsc hand ' nr lhl\ \\ hnk , 11 1: mine . . . 
111.1d 111L'll I I, ,~s~I Il , 1111. ,1117. x . (L'i1tpha"' ad1kd l. I X, l>1''i':lt 11'' 2m~. P 
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The features of dreaming and madncss highlighted in thc Search for Ji·11tlt 
make thcsc conditions similar to childhood and certain pathologies. Dreamcr1 
and mad pcoplc, as with children and diseased people, share a condition in 
which it is impossible to avoid the erroneous beliefs induced by senso 
experience19. The mad person believes that his or her body is made of glass, 
just as the chi ld bel ieves that a stick in the water is beni. In dreaming and 
madness, as in childhood and disease, it is the body lhat rules, whereas thc 
mind cannot exercise any active influence on the beliefs induced by bodily 
modifìcations. Far this reason, these conditions provide privileged observation 
points from which to study the physiological mcchanism of perception in 
isolation free from disturbance due to lhe mind's active intervention. Thus, to 
assess the role of dreaming and madness in the whole of Descartes ' 
philosophy, il is worthwhile to consider further the physiological mechanisms 
of sense perception. 
In both thc Treatise 0 11 Man and the Dioptrics, Descartes made clear that 
perception is actually a menta! phenornenon and is caused by the mind's 
contact with a brain modifìcation. On the other hand , lhis modifìcalion can be 
produced by lhe impelus of the animai spirits flowing lhrough lhe nerves, as a 
nerve's extrernily is slirnulaled either by an external object or by events laking 
piace in some parls of one's own body. Howcver, the same brain modifìcation 
can be produced also by lhe motions of lhe animai spirits that rise from the 
heart to the brain20. As the animai spirits acl on thc brain by flowing 
indepcndcnlly from any slimu lation by external objects, in the mind 
perceptions rnay arise, which, according lo their specifìc fealures, are called 
"imaginalions", "dreams", or evcn "madness", as the Dioptrics makes clear21 • 
However, as Descarles points out in the Passions of the Soul, il is only lhcir 
respeclive inlensity that rnakes it possible lo distinguish such imaginative 
perceptions from sensory perceplions: 
It remains to be noted that everything the soul perceives by means of the nervcs may 
also be rcpresented to it through the fortuitous coursc of thc spirits. The sole difference 
is that the impressions which come into thc brain through the nerves are normally 
more lively and more definite than those produced there by the spirits - a fact that led 
me to say in article 21 that the latter are, as it werc, a shadow or picture of thc former. 
We must also note that this picture is sometimcs so similar to the thing it reprcsents 
that it may mislead us regarding thc perceptions which refer to objects outside us, or 
19. Spinoza echoes this point when he considcrs chi ldhood and (not by chance) dream 
as the conditions in which it is evidcnt that judgments and therefore errors are necessitated 
by sense data. According lo Spinoza, this necessity holds always and at cvery stage of 
human development. Cf. Ethica Il, proposition 49, scholium (Spinoza 2010, p. 140): «[ ... ] 
concipiamus puerum, equum imaginantem, nec aliud quicquam percipiencem. 
Quandoquidem hacc imaginatio equi existentiam involvit [ ... ] nec puer quicquam percipit, 
quod equi existentiam tollat, ille necessario equum, ut praesentem, contemplabitur [ ... ]. 
Atque hoc quotidie in somnis cxperimur». 
20. Traité de l'Homme, AT Xl, p. 177, CSM I, p. 106; AT Xl, pp. 197- 198. 
21. LaDioptrique, AT VI , p. 141, CSM I, p. 172. 
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inh11' 1h11\l' wh1eh rdcr IO ccrta,111 paii...". wc i magi ne certain things so v1v1 ~ 
11111 i11111·\11lll'' evcn wl~cn wc an.: ~e:~ t~~m in our body, although they are no 
I ' \'" 'l'I.' 1hcm bel ore us, or I I 11111 .. H 
1 11 1111 i, . ·" the Soul Descartes d in the Passwns OJ • h 
\\ 111 i l•,1s i11 lhc Treatise o 11 Man ~~·on imagination, and drearning, in t ~ 
Il L li "" what is comrnon ~o sensa • m~dness to confirrn that the actua 
Il 11111 ,, ., hl' cvokcs drcamrng han~ ·rn corresponds to thc theory formulated 
. I ccptual mcc anis 
1111 111111111~· iii t 1c per. f this work: 
hl 111 "' I IK' prcv1ous pages o . . . k I ha ve explained 
li that v1s1on wor s as . . 
ma have no doubts at a . . es deceives us. First, it 
9'111 '" .,, ,11- 1 1hal you y "d the reasons why it somct1m I b means 
I I \\1111ld .11p111 havc you cons1h ereye· and it does not see direct_ly, but on Y thrnk they 
lh1 ""' wh1eh sces, and nodt t e and' those who are asleep olten sec, or·I certain 
.1.1. 1 ·. why ma men . th ·r eycs· namc y, I th1 i.1.1111 '~ is . h ncverthelcss not bctore e1 . ed in vision 
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,, I art 26 CSM I, P· 338· 
22. Les Passio11s de l ame, , ·, CSM I p. I 72. etach from the 
23. La Dioptriq11e, AT VI, p. I ~ , in ter~s of corporea! images that d rcsentation 
24. Thc account of re~r~sens~~j~~l corresponds exactly to the th~~f4 o6~e~racastoro's 
object and reach the per~e1~~~gFirst Book of Turri11s. See Fracas~oro ork ~trongly suggests 
presented by Fracastoro ~~ S ruit 1995, pp. 46-49. Fracastoro s o:scartes' talk of images theor~ of knowl.ed~cv~ew -~till endorsed by Pe~Jer 1997h - peth:~eiving subject is merely a 
rcvising thc rece1ve 11· from the objecl to t e 
!lying through thc air and ~rave r'~~ scholastic theory of knowlcdge. 
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and, at the sarne time on! d e possr e ?Y the percep1ual mechanism 
functioning of that mechanis~. ma ness reveals in an unequivocal way the 
~s madness shows that the roxim . . 
modrfication, it follows that pere~ tion ~te_ cause _of percep~1on '~ only a brain 
remote cause for it provides p "d n rtself g rves no ep1stem1c access to its 
modifìcation 'is some externat~b~~~t en~e tha~ the remote cause of the brain 
than the "vapours" of melanchol ~ Th Slimulatrng the nervous system, rather ~he pathological version of the ·~ irit~~,' ;uch v~.pours ~re to b~ understood as 
rnvoluntary imaginations th p . reel~ c1rculatmg dunng dreams and 
"f . ' e states in wh1ch the a . I .. 
ortu1tous" mo1ions encounte d n1ma spmts in lheir 
arousing the perceptions of abse:t an reop~n trace_s in the brain , thereby 
Descar1es, use of rnad or non-ex1stent ob1ects. 
later attempt lo deprive nessd appears. as the symmetrical opposite of Reid's 
reference to lhe insane whomba l?ess hot. any ~es1imonial value. Thi s lauer's 
· · e reve t e1r bod1cs are d f 1 · remin1scen1 of Descartes Reid ' · h . ma e o g ass 1s certainly 
th I · · s atm, owever 1s to make th · 
ese peop e irrelevani to understand· h h ' e expenences of 
rng t e p cnomenon of perception: 
The fìrst exceplion [lo the evidence of the . 
bcen pcrsuaded of things lhat seem lo sde~ses] is that of some lunatics who ha ve 
is sa·d th h contra 1ct the clear tesi· f · r ere ave been lunatics and h och . rmony o their senses. Il 
lhemselves to be made of glass [ ... ]. fif I ha~ndnacal pcrs~ns_, who seriously believed 
~resent state, are, as well as our bodies liahl 'e lo say lo th~s rs, that our minds, in our ~udge _of the natural constitution of the bod f~ lo stran~e d1sorders; _and, as we do not 
is. sub1ect f~om accidents, so neither ou h{ w~m t~e d1sorders or drseases to which it 
mrnd from its disorders but from ,·ls s gd ~~ Judge of the natural powers of the 
' oun state . 
Rcid appcars awarc that Descartes ref d . 
understand the pereeptual mechan · h e~re to drscase in order to 
In lhe Dioptrics, even the am r~m ,t at pertains lo the state of health. 
to unveil the rnechanism of percpul~e s cTahse ~as used as a erucial experiment 
lh b · ep lOn. e aim was · th" 
e rarn-centred hypothesis , . h . • 111 1s case, lo support 
th h h . agarnst t e v1ew that se "b·1 · . . ~o~g t e vanous parts of the bod 26 0 . . ns i 1 1ty 1s d1ffused m1ssrng limb cannot produce an y . . bv1ou_s ly, rn the amputee's case, the 
dreamed objects that bring ab~uste~~at1on, as '? a dream, where it is not Lhe 
sensation must be found else h e percept10n. Thus, the cause of the 
l . . w ere, namely in the bra· d h . 
ocates sensat1on rn other parts of th b d 111 , an t e v1ew that 
case, the pathological condition is e d ob y must be ruled out. Even in this 
the same time, il reveals thi s mech~~~ss~ y th~ per~eptual mechanism and, at 
does not enable Lhe perceiver to ide t"f ". Even rn thr s case, perception as such 
n 1 Y rts remote cause. 
25. Reid 1785, cssay Il, chap. 5, p. I 08 
. 26. Sce Descartes' reply to Fromondu.s' . . 
h1m: Descartes lo Plcmpius, 3 OcLober 1637 ;~~~llons thaL Plempius had lransmitted Lo 
reports the case of a young woman whose ar~ h , p. 420, CSMK. p. 64. Hcre, Dcscartes 
centred hypothesis about sensation. ad been amputated as confirming his brain-
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1111 phys1ological mcchanism or pcrccption is brielly described in the 
,, 11t f\.kdllation to cxplain Lhc origin or perceptual crrors. These take piace in 
!lil 1 •"l' or discasc as a consequcnce of Lhe normai invariable structure of thc 
hnd , I hc amputee feels pain in the phantom limb bccause the brain 
1m1dll1t atmn is Lhc same, regardlcss of the part or the nerve where stimulation 
11111.illy origi nates, and the dropsical person feels thirsty evcn though drinking 
d 1111,1fl'' the body, because the brain is modifìed in the very same way, even 
~h111 ;thnormal bodily conditions determine the same stimulation that in the 
11111111,il tlchydration of the body provokes Lhirst. Erroneous perceptions are 
11111~ l'Xplaincd by the rigidity of the nervous system. Even herc, however, 
11, .t .11lcs adds that the source of every perceptual error lies in the standard 
lllll llll'C of perception, that is, in the fact thal perception is always brought 
1h11111 only by a brain modification27. 
lhe heuristic value that the Dioptrics ascribes to madness and dreams is 
i1~11 what explains why these states represent in faet such formidable reasons 
1111 ( 'artcsian doubt. The impossibility of distinguishing dreams and madness 
110111 normai perception is ullimately justified by what physiology has shown, 
11.11ncly that the cause of Lhese altered or even pathological conditions is 
111t·dscly the standard mechanism of perception and not some perversion of it. 
Wi1h his usual intelligcnl fìdelity, La Forge presents Deseartes' unsettling 
lhl·ory in his Treatise on the Human Mind at the end of a long chapter devoted 
10 imagination. The association between imagination and madness already 
l11~·hlights the affini ty between involuntary imaginations caused by the animai 
'lllfils rising from the heart to the brain and menta! disorders - an affìnity 
dl·riving from Descartes' account of the pcrceptual mechanism. Furthermore, 
I ,1 Forge, as with Deseartes, assoeiates dreams with madness: «I shall 
ninclude this chapter by saying in a few words what is the cause of errors in 
our dreams and of the delirium of melancholics»28 . In hi s de1ailed analysis of 
madness, La Forge grasps the main point of Descartes' view. The cause of 
madness is the standard mechanism of perception: 
lhe generai cause of all Lhese mistakes [erreursl resulls from the facl thal all the idcas 
which are joined with spccics of the gland [ ... ] give the mind no opportunily Lo beware 
that it only perceives lhe image of objects, which send nolhing to the brain and gland 
hul the cffects of certain movemenls [la suite de quelques mouvemens]. On Lhe 
<:ontrary, they represcnt objects to the mind as if they wcre extemal to us and present 
10 our sense, lo which - or at leasl to our extemal limbs - thc mind relatcs all the 
qualities which are rcpresented to il by the ideas it has29• 
27. Meditationes de prima pliilosopliia, AT VII, p. 86. CSM Il , pp. 59-60: «the mind is 
not immediately affected by al i parts of the body, bul only by the brain, or perhaps just by 
one small part of Lhe brain, namely the parl which is said to contain the 'common' sense. 
Every time lhis part of the brain is in a given state, il presents the same signals Lo the mind, 
even though the other parts of the body may be in a different condition at the time. This is 
establishcd by countless obscrvations, which thcre is no need Lo review here.» 
28. La Forge 1974, p. 275; La Forge 1997, p. 174. 
29. La Forge 1974, pp. 275-276; La Forge 1997, p. 174. 
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. With the utmost lucidity, La Far e a r . . . . 
v1ew: sense perception is ent'. I b g·1 pp opnates ~he core o t Dcscartc,· perc~iving as objects locat~~e ~ut~;dt on a decept1.on, which consist' in mod1~cations. This is the reason wh t~ what are m ~acl s imply brain perce1v~s ob)ects that in fact are not t~eree mad person t~1~~s that he or shc 
and d1slmgu1sh the percept1·0 I . The only poss1b1hty to avoid error 
. . ns remote y caused b I . 
or. imagmalions lies in the res ective . y act~a obJects from dreams 
mmd will always be mistakenpas I perc.e~tual m1ens11y. Indeed, «the human 
species which stimulates an idea .to~g as Il is unable lo recognize whether thc 
the activity of the memory or the1 .as ~omes more from the senses lhan from 
. ~on~ersely, il is impossible ~~1~~1 spirits: or from its own will»Jo. 
ongmalmg from lhe exlernal the d1fference belween perceptions 
· senses and perce t. . . . · 
internal flow o f animai s . . h p ions ongmatmg frorn lhc 
· · pmts w enever both h h 
mlens1ty, as is the case in madness H ave. t . e sarne pe rceptual 
mad or sane, is in lhe same s· t . t' owever, the perce1vmg subject, be thcy 
because of thc intensity of th . i ua i o~ whenever they rely on sense data· 
'"'.orld as it rcally is. Fénelo~r s~;~~er1on s, the.y belie~e they see the externaÌ 
v1ew by evoking lhe fcature of g/ dramat1zes th1s aspect of Descartcs' ~earch for Truth: «How can I b ma ness underscored by Descartes in thc 
msanity_J? If someone is in it, h~ ~~~~r~d th~t I am not i.n this .condition li.e. of 
lhat he is not in thi s condition 31 ot thmk lhat hc is; he is as sure as I am 
I I' » . 
. n ight of the Dioptrics, Derrida's re I . 
m a differe nt way Of course . ·1 . p y to Foucault is worth dramali.lation 
d
. · , ass1rn1 at1on to dre · 
o r mary phenornenon perfcctly . t d . ammg lurns rnadness into an 
fact that both dream'ing and mdegrate mto everyday life. However the 
d 
ma ness have be d ' 
un ersland norrnality blurs or even er . . e~ use as paradigrns to 
norrnality. Thus madness . ases the d1stmct1on between madness and 
· d ' ' 1s no t so rnuch t · · I · 
m iscernible from normality Th a nv1a ep1sode as a condition 
La Forge and especially Ma.I b e c~nse4ucnc~s thereof are made explicit by 
Elucidation of The Search aifte :;i-nchcH, who d1 scusses this topic in the Sixth 
I 
. er irut . ere madne . 
an a most 1.1leral quotalion from lhe F, s~ co.rne~ mto pl ay through 
Descarles tncd to marginal1'se ·t· Th irst Med1tal1on s passage where 
M I b 1 · « ey were mad ·11 
a e ranche, with respect to the h li . . , you w1 say», repeats 
evidence against certain knowlcd e ~fucmat1~ns of rnad people adduced as 
However, contrary to what happen~d in ~e cx1ste,nc~ of the external world32. ~o Malebranche, madncss cannot be sim esca~tes. F1rst Meditation, according 
irnpossibility of proving the . t f ply d1srn1ssed as an argurnent for the 
t . . . cx1s ence o the external Id . . 
o ass1m1late it to a dream to hi hli h . . . . wor ' nor is tt nccessary 
say, and I agree; but their soulg wa~ ~~:s tnvbe1ahty.: «They. were rnad, you will 
e to m1staken m these things, and 
3 01. FLéa Fol rge 1974, p. 276; La Forge 1997 p 174 
- · ne on 1997, p. 579. · · · 
32. Malebranche t 997 570 . . Malebranche 1976 p 56) '1 p. I . The originai Lex1 ( «C' étoient des fous d' 
. • · e ear y echoes o f' . 1ra-t-on»· 
qu01. ce sont des fous» escartes, irst MeditaLion AT IX p 14· M · · · • • · . « a1s
llh I 1111 / ~ 11111 t1lld ft/111/iw\\ 
111 1 111/ otll<'r 111l'll co11 fo/1 11110 si111i/ar errors»3\ As lhe pcrccption'> of both 
111111 ,111d ,anc pcoplc are dctcrmincd only by brain modifica1ions, the 
li 1111• 1i11n hctwccn the formcr and thc lattcr can only be a matter of statistics: 
11111 111 thc hnal analysis, how can wc be ccrtain that those we call rnad really 
111 ,., ' Might it not be said that they only pass for mad bccause their 
11 .1111 lii' l sl'11time11s l are peculiar? For it is clear that a man passes for rnad 
1
1
111 hn il\J'>C hc scc~ what is not but preciscly because he sees the opposi te of 
'1.11 11thcrs scc, whether they are deceived or not»
34
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Il 11 " thc motions in the brain that provide us with knowledgc of external 
1h111 ., 1hcn «why need therc be external bodies for thcse motions to be stirred 
lii' 111 11ur brain? Do not sleep, the passions, ànd madness produce such 
11111llllll' without the aid of extcrnal bodies?»35 As correctly remarked, in 
"l.1lrhrnnche, madncss becomes a phenornenon indi scernible from mental 
h· .tl th "'. The reason for such a paradoxical cqualisation of madncss and 
1111 n1al hcalth is to be found in the use of madness made by Cartesian 
1
1hy,1ology, as described above: here, rnadness has becorne the touchstone of 
"'" 111ali ty. Tuus, it is worth noting that rnadness, aftcr being assimilatcd to 
tlll ,1111'> by Descartes in the First Meditation, is not evcn mentioned in the 
,, ,1h. when the doubt must be resolved regarding whether a drcam can be 
.i1,11nguished from a wake state. Here, Descartes claims thal il is easy to tell 
1hr diffcrence betwecn these two conditions. One could object, however, that a 
tlll·.1m cnds as one wakes up, but this is not so with madncss. Of course, 
.wl·cping madncss under the comfortable carpet of dreams helps to neutralise 
1hl' ùoubt regarding the cxistence of the external world . However, La Forge 
.imi Malcbranche did not wait long to dig up rnadness and reopen in this way 
lhl' ... ccptical problern. Aftcr ali , ali the Cartcsians who were originally attractcd to Descartes' 
phtlosophy more by hi s physiology than his metaphysics agree on the 
1mpossibility of making sure via our perceptions that the external world exists. 
\-, is well known, Cordcmoy relics on faith and is followed by Malebranche. 
I .ess known is that the first to rcly on faith is Henricus Regius, who is also the 
doscst to Descartcs in the ficld of physiology. Hi s Philosophia naturalis 
hegins with the same claim that Cordemoy and Malebranche latcr rcpeat: the 
ex istcnce of extemal bodies is mercly plausible and only fai th can make it 
... ure. 
Natural things are those that are endowed with a nature. From thc probable ccrtainty of 
our intellcct, that is of our senses, reminiscencc, imagination. and judgmcnt. .. thc truc 
existence of thesc things is as plausible as possible; but from God's infallible 
revelation made to 11s in the Bib/e, it is by ali means indubitable
31
. 
33. Malebranche I 997, p. 570, emphasis added. 
34. Jbid., translation slighlly modified. 
35. Ivi., p. 57 1. translation slightly modified. 
36. de Buzon 2010. 37. Regius 1654, p. I. Regius has recently aroused some interest among scholars: cf. 
610 l.11u111111'la SNihm10 
Regius is an early and importanL witness of Lhe physiological rooL of thc 
loss of the cxternal world in the Cartesian culture. 
As for Lhe use of madness in Descartes' metaphysical path, the Dioptrin 
and Cartesian physiology in generai suggest a further rencction. In the case of 
the mad person, who - as everybody acknowledges - perceives a non-existent 
reality, it would be more appropriate to say that she «thinks that she sees» 
things thal in fact she does not see: «it is the soul which sees, and not the eye; 
and it does not see direct ly, but only by means of the brain. That is why 
madmen and those who are asleep oflen see, or think they see, various objects 
which are nevcrthcless not before their eyes»38. As is well known, however, 
for evcry human being, it is true that «it is the soul which sces, and not thc 
eye»and that «il does nol see directly, but only by means of thc brain». Thus, it 
has to be true for every human being that they «often sec, or think thcy sec, 
various objects which are neverthelcss not bcfore their eyes». 
The expression used by Descartcs to explain and illustrate the illusions 
of mad people is the samc that he happens to use in the Second Meditation 
to reduce perceplion to thc appcarance of perceiving. Whal is certainly true 
and indubitable in my vision is that il secms to me that T am seeing: «vidcre 
videor»39. Seeing is actually the appearance of secing. If read in lighl of the 
physiological writings, Descartes' doubt about the existence of the external 
world looks li ke the meditative transposition of the difficulty in progressing 
from perceptions to the external world - a diffìculty made insurmountable 
by the physiological theory of perception. Even the reduction of perception 
to consciousncss, whose originality in the field of perceptual analysis has 
been always and rightly underscored40, originates d ircclly from that 
difficulty. But in fact, if seen in light of the physiological analysis of 
perception, such a reduction appears to be a sort of phi losophical 
transposition of whaL only physiology makes it possible to affirm. 
Considcring madncss from Lhc same point of vicw takcn by Descartes in the 
Search for Truth, Fénclon happens lo compare wilh pcrfect symmetry both 
appearances of seeing, that of the mad person and that of the meditator: 
«How can I be assured that I am not in this condition [i.e. of insanity]? If 
someone is in it, hc does not think that he is; he is as surc as I am that he is 
not in this condition. My own belief that I am seeing what it seems to me 
that I am seeing is nol stronger than his own»41 • 
Verbcck 1994a,b, Wilson 2000; Clarke 2010; Kolesnik-Antoine 2010; Bos 2013 and Bellis 
20 13. 
38. La Dioptrique, AT VI, p. 141, CSM I, p. 172, emphasis addcd. 
39. AT VII, p. 29, CSM Il. p. 19: «I am now seeing light, hearing a noise. feeling heat. 
But I am a~leep, so ali this is false. Yet I ccrtainly seem to sec, to hear, and to be warmcd. 
This cannot be false; what is called "having a sensory perception" is strictly just this, and in 
this restricted sense of the term it is simply thinking.» (emphasis added). 
40. Among the most recent contributions see Davies 1990; Carraud 2010; Palaia (ed.) 
2013; and Viano 2013. 
41. Fénelon 1997, p. 579. 
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